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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue
of the order of the Utah Supreme Court (plated November 6, 1987,
and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the judgment entered on August
31, 1987, by the Honorable Boyd L. Park, Fourth District Court
Judge, in favor of respondent Western Sujrety Company and against
appellant Joseph F. Ollivier on Western Surety Company's
third-party complaint for indemnification.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Respondent is satisfied with appellant's statement.

B.

Statement of Facts
1.

On December 1, 1978, respondent Western Surety

Company ("Western Surety"), as surety, issued a motor vehicle
dealer's bond to Herf's Heritage Motors, Inc., as principal.

The

bond is reproduced at A-l.
2.

In conjunction with the issuance of said bond,

appellant Joseph F. Ollivier ("Ollivier"), among others, signed
an Application for Bond ("indemnity agreement"), an integral part
of which contains provisions for the indemnification of Western
Surety on the bond.

(Findings of Fact Nos> 1 and 5, reproduced

at A-5; Trial Trans, p. 135, reproduced at A-9.)
-1-

The Application

for Bond is reproduced at A-4.
3.

At the time Ollivier signed the indemnity

agreement, he was a shareholder in Heritage Motors and providing
financial support to Heritage Motors.

(Findings of Fact Nos. 2,

4; Trial Trans, pp. 96-97, reproduced at A-10 and 11.)
4.

At the time Ollivier signed the indemnity

agreement, he possessed a substantial educational and business
background (Trial Trans, pp. 92-94, 137, reproduced at A-12 to
15.)
5.

Sometime in 1982, Ollivier no longer intended to be

affiliated with Heritage Motors.

(Trial Trans, p. 113,

reproduced at A-16.)
6.

Ollivier never notified Western Surety of any

intent on his part to withdraw as indemnitor under the indemnity
agreement, (Trial Trans, p. 108, reproduced at A-17), and never
notified Western Surety of the termination of his business
interests with the principal Heritage Motors.

(See Appellant's

Brief, p. 2.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly found Western Surety entitled
to indemnification from appellant Ollivier under the terms and
conditions of the indemnity agreement signed by Ollivier.

Under

governing law, the indemnity agreement was to be terminated at the
will of either party and only by clear and unequivocal notice to
-2-

the other party.

It is undisputed that neither Western Surety

nor Ollivier gave such notice.

Therefore, the agreement was

never terminated.
The mere fact that Ollivier concluded his business
relationship with the principal to the ijmderlying bondf which
fact was also not disclosed to Western Surety, does not somehow
terminate his contractual relationship w|ith Western Surety.

Such

an argument is contrary to case law as well as fundamental
principles of contract.

Moreover, the fkct that the terms of the

bond required annual premiums did not impose a similar
requirement of an annual renewal of the Separate indemnity
agreement in the absence of such terms ir) said agreement.
Finally, Western Surety is entitled as a surety to the
protection for which it bargained in the Indemnity agreement.
Western Surety reasonably expected that the extent of the
indemnity obligation was to be the same a£ the outer limits of
its own risk exposure with respect to the bond.

It is only fair

and reasonable to require Ollivier to provide the same clear and
unequivocal notice of withdrawal from his obligation that Western
Surety would be legally obligated to provide in the event it
sought to withdraw as surety.

In the absence of such notice,

both Western Surety and Ollivier must remain bound by the legally
enforceable agreement.

-3-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED THE DULY
EXECUTED INDEMNITY AGREEMENT IN THE ABSENCE
OF AN EFFECTIVE TERMINATION OR REVOCATION
OF THE AGREEMENT.
A.

Where An Indemnity Agreement Does Not Expressly
Limit Its Duration, It Is A Contract Terminable At
Will Upon Notice of Either Party.

While the appellant draws this Court's attention to the
indemnity agreement's silence relative to its duration and
termination, the appellant wholly fails to direct this Court to
the applicable rule of law:
"A contract of indemnity continues in
force only during such time as is
expressly or impliedly provided for in
the contract, and if no such time is
fixed for its duration, it is a contract
terminable at the will of either party."
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, Section 8 (1968).

The Utah Supreme

Court has adopted this rule and has further held that such
termination "must be with notice to the other party which is
clear and unequivocal."

Insurance Company of North America v.

Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., 617 P.2d 366, 368 (Utah 1980).

See also, Consolidated Theatres v. Theatrical Stage E.U.L., 447
P.2d 325 (Cal. 1968), an often-quoted case in regards to the
duration of contracts generally when no express term exists in
the contract itself. The court stated at page 335: [continued on
page 5.]
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In his unsuccessful motion for summary judgment in the
trial court, the appellant himself referred to this general rule
as "encyclopedia law," arguing that the indemnity agreement
clearly provided that the duration of the agreement was the
one-year term applicable to the underlying bond.

On appeal,

appellant now argues the opposing view $nd emphasizes the
uncertainty and ambiguity in the agreement relative to its
duration.

Contradiction aside, neither lof appellant's arguments

properly apply the acceptable general rujle.
In Insurance Company of North America v. Lanseair Travel
Agency, Inc., supra, a travel agency ("principal") entered into a
ticket agency contract with an association of airline carriers,
who required the principal to provide a Surety bond. An
insurance company ("surety") issued a boijid on condition that both
the principal and its president, in his individual capacity,
execute an indemnity agreement.

Just before the annual bond

premium was due, the president sold his ownership interest in the
principal and requested by letter that the association inform the

[Continued from page 4]
"In such cases, the law usually implies
that the term of the duration shall be at
least a reasonable time, and that
obligations under the contract sfrall be
terminable at will by any party upon
reasonable notice, after such reasonable
time has elapsed." [Emphasis addted.]
-5-

surety that he would no longer be personally liable on the bond.
The letter was never received and the surety was never notified.
Owing to financial problems, the principal never paid
the annual premium and the airline carriers began filing claims
against the bond for losses on ticket sales.

The surety paid the

claims and subsequently sued the former president as indemnitor
under the indemnity agreement.

The indemnitor argued in defense

that he was not liable under the agreement since (1) it had been
revoked and (2) it had expired due to non-payment of premiums.
The trial court enforced the agreement and held him liable as
indemnitor.

The Supreme Court affirmedf finding (1) that the

surety never received the required notice of revocation and (2)
that the bond had not automatically expired upon non-payment of
premiums but had continued in force for thirty days thereafter,
under the terms of the agreement, during which time the losses
occurred.

617 P.2d at 368.
In this case, the appellant argues that since the

indemnity agreement in question did not expressly limit its
duration or define the method for its termination, he should
somehow be excused from providing Western Surety with the
required notice of his revocation.

Such an argument is neither

fair nor reasonable under the circumstances and runs contrary to
the applicable rule of law relied upon in Lanseair Travel Agency
and upon which the appellant himself had earlier relied.
-6-

A review of the indemnity agreement in the Lanseair
Travel Agency case shows the relevant language to be very similar
to the agreement in question here.

Spepifically, there is no

express limitation on the duration of the agreement.

Rather, the

Lanseair agreement merely provided in pertinent part as follows:
"In consideration of the inclusion of the
undersigned in the Schedule Bond as
aforesaid, the undersigned agrees to. . .
fully indemnify and save Surety harmless
from and against all loss, costs,
charges, suits, damages, counsel fees and
expenses of whatever kind or nature which
the Surety shall sustain or incur or be
put to, by reason or in consequjence of
the Surety having included the
undersigned in the aforesaid Schedule
Bond, or any continuation thereof or any
successory obligation in the sajne or a
different amount;. . ."
617 P.2d at 36 8.

In concluding that such terms bound the

indemnitor "until the agreement was properly revoked or
terminated," the court expressed no concern over the agreement's
silence relative to its duration and termination.

The court

never considered the agreement as uncertain or ambiguous.
Instead, the court simply cited and relief upon the general rule
set forth in 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, Section 8 (1968), that an
indemnity agreement is revocable at will ^ipon notice by either
party.

617 P.2d at 368.
In this case, the relevant language in the agreement in

question provides in pertinent part as follows:

-7-

"The undersigned applicant and
indemnitors hereby request WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY, (the Company) to become surety
for and furnish the above bond and such
other bonds as may now or hereafter be
required by or on behalf of the
applicant.
The undersigned. . .jointly and severally
in consideration of the Company becoming
surety, or executing or guaranteeing any
bond for the applicant, do for value
received hereby covenant, promise and
agree to pay the Company the usual
premium, and jointly and severally agree
and indemnify and keep indemnified the
Company from and against any liability,
and all loss, cost, charges, suits,
damages, counsel fees and expenses
whatsoever which the Company shall at any
time sustain or incur, for or in
consequence of the Company having become
surety or entering into such bond. . ..w
[Emphasis added.]
These terms clearly suggest, as did those at issue in Lanseair
Travel Agency, that the indemnity agreement provides a continuing
obligation not necessarily limited to a single bond.

Moreover,

in absence of an express provision relative to its duration or
termination, the obligations thereunder are to continue unless
and until either (1) termination by either party upon notice, or
(2) termination of the underlying bond.
B. Appellant's Withdrawal From the Principal's Business
Did Not Revoke or Terminate the Indemnity Agreement.
Appellant argues that "it is logical and reasonable to
rule that Mr. Ollivier's contract for indemnity ended at the end
of the year he withdrew from any ownership interest in the
-8-

business [of the principal]."

See Appellant's Brieff p. 4-5.

Appellant seems to be asking this court} to rule, as a matter of
law, that an indemnitor must be required to have an economic
I
interest in a principal before indemnifying the principal's
surety on the bond.

Such an argument c&nnot be supported by the

terms of this agreement, statutory or c^se law, or the ordinary
course of dealing in indemnification agreements.
In Aetna Insurance Company v. Buchanon, 369 So.2d 351
(Fla. App. 1979), the court held that ar} individual indemnitor
should not be entitled to unilaterally tjerminate his obligation
under an indemnity agreement on the sole) basis that his business
relationship with the principal had terminated.

In that case, as

in this one, the court was dealing with an indemnity agreement
that was silent as to the means of its termination.

The court

found no ambiguity by reason of the agreement's silence and
simply concluded:
"It seems obvious to us that the parties
intended, and certainly the surety
expected, that the extent of the
indemnity obligation was to be tlfie same
as the outer limits of the surety's risk
exposure with respect to the bond. To
say than an indemnitor under such an
arrangement may unilaterally cancel any
further indemnity obligation on his part
while the bond remains in effect would
contradict the clear provisions c^f the
indemnity agreement and undermine) the
protection for which the surety
bargained." 369 So.2d at 354.
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In response to the indemnitor's defense that it would be "absurd
and unconscionable" to leave him exposed to liability for the
conduct of a principal with whom he had severed business
relations, the court responded:
"This is not an absurd or unconscionable
result but the foreseeable consequence of
[the indemnitor's] assumption of the
indemnity obligation. We can find no
authority for the proposition that an
individual who undertakes an obligation
as indemnitor on behalf of a principal to
whom he then has a business relationship,
thus making the arrangement advantageous
to both, should be entitled to terminate
that obligation when the business
relationship has ended and the
arrangement is no longer beneficial to
the indemnitor. His motive for
undertaking the obligation may no longer
exist, and indeed he may have every
reason in the world for desiring to
relieve himself of the obligation, but he
nevertheless remains bound by the clear
language of the agreement." 369 So.2d at
354. [Emphasis added.]
In Lanseair Travel Agency, the Utah Supreme Court
expressly required that the individual indemnitor, who had
similarly sold his ownership interest in the principal, to
provide "clear and unequivocal" notice to the surety before
effectively revoking the agreement.

The court added: "it is fair

and reasonable that the indemnitor can absolve himself from
liability only after giving the surety reasonable time to secure
a release from its own liability."

-10-

617 P.2d at 368.

In this casef the appellant indemnitor admits that he
"did not notify Western Surety of the germination of his business
interest with Heritage Motors." See Appellant's Brief, p. 2.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that appelllant never notified
Western Surety of his intentions to revoke or terminate the
indemnity agreement.

Under the foregoing law, appellant is

accordingly precluded from denying liability under the indemnity
agreement.
C.

Appellant's Continuing Obligations Under The
"indemnity Agreement Were Ncj>t Conditioned OrT"An
Annual Renewal Of The Agreement.

Appellant argues in passing th4t Western Surety was
required to renew its indemnity agreement with the appellant on
an annual basis.

Appellant's Brief, p. 4-5.

Appellant provides

no basis whatsoever for this proposition], aside from implying
that since the bond required annual premiums, the indemnity
agreement should require an annual renewal.

Such a groundless

proposition runs directly contrary to th$ above-quoted general
rule providing that where an indemnity agreement is silent as to
its duration, it is a contract terminably at will upon the notice
of either party.
Although the appellant may by himself conclude it
advisable for a surety to annually check t>n its indemnitors,
neither he nor this Court may properly impose such a procedure as
a legal obligation in the absence of statute or contract terms to
-11-

that effect. Moreover, it should be noted that the indemnity
agreement in question was signed by the appellant in 1978. The
appellant did not sell his ownership interest in the principal
until 1982. The appellant certainly knew or should have known
that Western Surety Company had no intentions of renewing the
indemnity agreement on an annual basis and that Western Surety
considered the application and indemnity agreement a one-time
transaction that would remain in full force and effect so long as
2
the bond or successive bonds remained in effect.
As such, the
indemnity agreement becomes a contract terminable upon clear
notice by either party.

Insurance Company of North America v.

Leanseair Ticket Agency, Inc., supra.
Unlike the factual situation in Lanseair Ticket Agencyf
the underlying bond in this case was never terminated.

There is

no question as to whether the annual premiums had been paid at
the time the losses occurred.

The bond continued in full force

and effect without regard to the appellant's business dealings/
all the while subjecting Western Surety to potential liability
for claims against the bond.

In order for Western Surety to

withdraw as surety on the bond, it would have been required to

See generally, Holmgren v. Utah Idaho Sugar Company, 582 P.2d
856 (Utah 1978), wherein the court recognized that "contracts are
not void or voidable merely because they may be of long duration
or last in perpetuity." 582 P.2d at 860.
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give reasonable notice of withdrawal.

The principal would

naturally be entitled to such notice irii order to allow him to
properly seek and obtain alternative insurance.
By the same argument, it is or}ly fair and reasonable for
Western Surety to be entitled to reasonable notice from an
indemnitor who intends to withdraw, thereby ensuring Western
Surety the protection for which it bargained and allowing it the
necessary time to secure its own release from its obligations.
See, American Surety Company of New Yorl|c v. Blake, 27 P.2d 972,
974 (Idaho 1933); Aetna Insurance Co. v1 Buchanon, supra, 369
So.2d at 354. There is no disputing th^ fact that Western Surety
was never given such notice.
CONCLUSION
Controlling law, as well as principles of fairness and
reasonableness, required the appellant tq provide Western Surety
with "clear and unequivocal" notice of termination before
effectively relieving himself of his leg^l obligations under the
indemnity agreement.

Appellant admits ttjiat he failed to provide

Western Surety with such notice.

Furthermore, appellant's

termination of his business association with the principal, of
which appellant also admittedly never notified Western Surety,
does not under controlling law constitute a termination of the
indemnity agreement.

Finally, the one-year term of the bond did

-13-

not somehow work to terminate the indemnity agreement which did
not under its terms require an annual renewal.
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Western Surety
Company respectfully requests this Court to affirm the holding of
the trial court that the indemnity agreement in question was in
full force and effect at the time of the losses at issue and
therefore require the appellant Joseph L. Ollivier to indemnify
Western Surety for the same.
DATED this

IQ^

day of

f^6ili/4-A^1

1988.

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

PLANT
CHRISTENSEN
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WESTERN JURTTY COMPANY
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oc'(Pow>dgeu 'a me t*at he titcufed the *ame

t d o f f me p~r,onul!y come
, to rne Ivno^ep
and who executed tne forcqeovj instrument, and*

(SCAt)
Notary Pvbl»c
Gorr.m^>ron Empires

PARTNERSHIP OR FIRM ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL
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COUNTY Of
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day of

1°

.
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....

to me known
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...
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devcnb*«J in ami who executed the M m t as and far the act and 6m^d of said firm
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Comn^jsion E*piret

..
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Notary Public

CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCIPAL
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•IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREElj) THAT THE BOND
IS AMENDED TO SHOW TH2 CORRECT NAME OF THE
PRINCIPAL AS: HERITAGE MOTORS. INC."

Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms, limits or coMt
tion* of the

Bond

except as hereinabove set forth.

This Rider becomes efTt>ctive on the
lAfJl
twelve and one minutu o'clock A M , Standard Time.

day of

December

197JL. at

Attached u> and forming part of
I??™*
No.... 2 3 8 1 7 7 5
A * , ^ D e c e m b e r 1 4 t h t« 7 8
issued b> the WESTERN SL'RETY COMPANY OK SIOUX FALLS. SOUTH DAKOTA, tfl

Herfjs Heritage Motors, I n c .
Signed this

x

15*1—A

day of

December
V. E S T E R N
By..

_ .

#

SURETY

«78

COMPANY

_..H
Authorized Representative

i j»
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APPUCAlLt

FXT^Mf* UM POLLOWtlKa PACU

-•rf
TERRY M. PLANT
HANSON, DOHH, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Western Surety Company
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-7611

RECEIVE.: ~~
j FEB ' 51988
HANSON, DUNN
.EPPERSON & SMt^.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
•• n i l i ill II ir

r i i n i i i n tiin<i H I irrrihn f i i i i i t t U r f x w i m n n inmmii ' n u r i i r r i n

mrm r i m

r

ALLSTATE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
-vsCONCLUSIONS OF LAW
GLENN WILLIAM HERIFORD,
HERITAGE MOTORS, and
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Defendants.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Third-Party

Civil No. 71286

Plaintiff,

-vsJAN L. HERIFORD, JOSEPH F.
OLLIVIER and LINDA S. OLLIVIER,
+k+d*im*im+m*l+k*kt****+t**m*+»*Kmm***mmaU+**m+^*~h*+***,

This matter having come before the Court for trial on
May 7, 1987, the plaintiff Allstate Enterprises, Inc. having
settled and resolved its claim prior to trial and said settlement
reflected in a separate document. The trial between third-party
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plaintiff Western Surety Company and third-party defendant Joseph
P. Ollivier having gone forward; the third-party plaintiff
Western Surety Company being represented by Terry M. Plant and
the third-party defendant being represented by Allen K. Young,
and the Court having heard evidence and argument of counsel
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law*
FINDINGS;kQF. FACT
1. That the Application for Bond and attached
financial statement marked Exhibits 3 and 5, respectively/ were
signed by third-party defendant Joseph F. Ollivier*
2.

That Mr. Ollivier's involvement with the business

of Heritage Motors was to provide financial support to the
business*
3*

That an integral part of the automobile business

was the obtaining of a motor vehicle dealer bond since said bond
is required by law before business can be done as an automobile
dealer*
4*

That Joseph F* Ollivier knew that his role with the

business was to provide financial support for the business which
included the financial support needed for the issuance of the
Western Surety bond in question*
5*

That the indemnification provisions found on

Exhibit 3, the Application for Bondf are an integral part of that
document•

A-6
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6.

That since Mr. Ollivier signed Article 3, he cannot

escape the language of the Application for Bond which requires
him to imdemnify Western Surety.
7.

That Western Surety had no obligation to make an

annual renewal of the indemnification agreement as long as annual
premium payments are made.

There is no necessity for Western

Surety to renew the application and indemnity agreement every
year*
8.

That the third-party defendant Joseph Ollivier has

substantial education and business background.

Given his

background, he knew or should have known of the impact of the
indemnification language contained in Exhibit 3, Application for
Bond.

1.

That Western Surety is entitled to judgment against

the third-party defendant Western Surety in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the indemnification agreement signed by
third-party defendant Joseph Ollivier and marked Exhibit 3
hereto.
2.

That said judgment will include all monies which

defendant Western Surety has paid to Allstate Enterprises in
settlement of the claim against Western Surety under the bond
which total $9,000. Further, Western Surety shall be entitled to
recover attorney's fees, costs, and all other expenses associated

A-7
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with being a surety and as otherwise set forth in the indemnity
agreement.
3.

That since Mr. Ollivier signed Exhibit 3, he is

charged with the legal responsibility of knowing the content of
the document which requires him to indemnify Western Surety
Company as set forth in the Conclusion of Law No* 1.
DATED t h i s

JU

•*****«*£***»

day of

SsS*^^

BY THE COOI&:

HONORABLE BOYD L. PARK
Fourth D i s t r i c t Judge
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, 1987,

in a normal equity case.
bank.

And a surety is not like a

A bank loan is an entirely different animal than

one of a surety and an indemnification.

Mr. Young has

done a fine job of the comparison I don't believe they
are the same animal at all.
I am concerned and feel some regret because of the
circumstances and maybe some who would feel a little
different than I would with regard to the case but
it appears to me that I have to find that the Application
for the Bond contains sufficient language for
indemnification and that signatures thereto once they havebeen accepted by the surety company and a bond has been
issued you become fixed and they are an integral part of
the bond.
I have to believe that it is Mr. Ollivier's signature.
I can appreciate that he might not remember it but there is
no evidence to the contrary that it is not his signature
other than his lack of memory and that he doesn't think
he would have signed such a thing because he doesn't
think he would have signed it unless he had read it. He
may not have read it but that would not allow him to
escape from the terms of the

application and the

indemnification contained therein because he , if he did
in fact sign it, and that is a finding of the court that he
did sign it.
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Q

And in fact you became a shareholder in a

corporation by the name of Heritage Motors did you not?
A

Yes.

Q

What

per cent of that business did you own in

1978?
A

I think that it was 20 per cent

I am not positive

about that because the shares eventually became worthless
but I think it was 20 per cent,
Q
you

And you are aware of another claim pending against

Valley Bank vs. Western Surety vs. Yourself?
A

Yes.

Q

You know that claim?

A

Yes.

Q

You

aware that your attorney has submitted

a memorandum in that case in support of the Motion for
Summary Judgment have you read that?
A

(no answer)

Q

In that memorandum they indicate that you own one

third of the business is that closer to your accurate
or 20 per cent?
A
any

I

probably have to I looked and I couldn't find

records or certificates I thought it was 25 per cent

but you know I could be wrong about that but I believe it
was 20 per cent.
Q

But nonetheless you were a part owner of the busmeBS

A-10
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and you knew that?
A

I owned some shares in it),

Q

And that you heard Mr. Heriford testify

haven't you?
A

Yes.

Q

And you heard

him-tell this court that your

primary purpose for being involved was that he didn't have
the financial wherewithal to get the business going and he
relied on your financial strength to do that?
A

To get a loan at Zions Bank yes.

Q

But and you would agree with his statement that I

just made wouldn't you?
A

Yes he was relying on my financial ability.

Q

Because he had none and was a 27 year old newly-

wed without anything?
A

I didnut

know that he didn't have anything.

I

knew that he apparently , in our discussions, did not have
enough- to

get a flooring line that was what our discussions

were about.
Q

And so you do recall going to Zions Bank and

signing a number of documents floorinq agreements and
other such documents whereby you bound yourself to be
financially responsible for loans and things that which
were necessary
A

to get the business going didn't you?

Collateralized

loans yes.
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1

Western Surety Company being first duly.sworn was examined

2

and testified as follows:

3
4

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR, PLANT:

5

Q

Would you please state your name sir?

5

A

Joseph F. Ollivier.

7

Q

Present address?

g

A

1040 Windsor Drive, Provo, Utah.

9

Q

Presently married?

10

A

11

Q

To who?

12

A

Allyson, that is my wife's name.

13

Q

How long have you been married to her?

14

A

About 8 months.

15

Q

You were formerlly married to Linda Ollivier were

16

y° u

Yes.

not?

17

A. Yes.

18

Q

From when to when did that marriage last?

19

A

From 1967 until 1982.

20

Q

How many years is that?

21

A

14 I think , 14 or 15.

22

Q

What do you do for a living?

23

A

I am a stock broker.

24

Q

And you have a degree from some institution?

25

A

Yes I graduated from B.Y.U.
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Q

In what?

A

In business I am sorry statistics.

Q

When?

A

In 1965.

Q

How old are you?

A

I am 45.

Q

You just have a Bachelor's degree?

A

Yes.

Q

Any post graduate degrees?

A

Yes.

Q

What?

A

I have a masters in business.

Q

Business Administration?

A

Yes a MBA Degree.

Q

Where was that?

A

From Stanford University.

Q

When?

A

In 1967.

Q

All right and do you work with a brokerage company

A

Yes, I work for Shearson Lehman Brothers.

Q

How long have you worked for them?

A

Since 1982.

Q

Where did you work before that?

A

For Foster and Marshall which is another brokerage

here?

A-13
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firm acquired by Shearson.
Q

When did or how long did you work for Foster and

Marshall?
A

Since 1979.

Q

Where did you work before that?

A

I worked for a company called Dayne and Bosworth.

Q

That is a brokerage firm also?

A

That is also a brokerage firm also.

Q

How long did you do that?

A

For approximately six years.

Q

You have had a lot of business experience haven't

you Mr. Ollivier?
A

I have had some yes.

Q

A lot haven't you?

A

In the brokerage business yes.

Q

In the brokerage business you have to sign a

lot of documents and you have to sign a lot of agreements and
you have to sign a lot of contracts don't you?
A

I have to sign customer agreements yes.

Q

And you are used to signing documents as a matter

of course I would imagine?
A Yes.
Q

And you understand that when you sign a document

it is implied by law that you have read that document?
A

Yes I believe I do.

A-14
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in this particular agreement that bothers me that is my mosjt
difficult hurdle to get over.

However, in view of the

education of Mr. Ollivier and in view of his business
experience I am going to have to decide that

favor

of~the bonding company Western Surety.
So based on that reasoning and those facts it is the
Judgment of this court that Western Surety have a Judgment
over against Mr. Ollivier for their amount of money that
they are obligated to pay under the bond and for such
costs as they have incurred and Reasonable attorney
fees.

Reasonable attorney fees will be submitted by

affidavit in accordance with our Administrative Order I
think it is I am not sure 25 but I am not sure what it- is.
You will submit copies to Mr. Young of those affidavits
so that he can raise any objections that he feels are
appropriate.
Also Mr. Plant you will draw the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this matter and submit
those to Mr. Young under Rule 2.9 and then to the court.
Anything further?
MR. PLANT:

No Your Honor.

THE COURT:

This is the first case maybe it will

get a test if there is a lot of them out there.
MR. YOUNG:

Will have tjo Your Honor.

THE COURT:

May very well I can understand that.
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1

Q

Did anyone ever communicate with you to determine

2

whether you were still^first of all still associated with

3

Heritage Motors Inc.?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Did - -

6 I

MR. PLANT:

You mean the "world"?

7

MR- YOUNG:

No.

8

BY MR.YOUNG:

9

Q

Did Western Surety

or Blackley Insurance ever

10

either write you~„or call you or communicate with you to

11

determine whether you were still affiliated with Heritage

12

Motors?

13 I

A

No they didn't.

14

Q

Did you intend to be affiliated with Heritage

15

after 1982?

16 I

A

No.

17

Q

Had you known you had any obligation

18

what would

you have done?

19

MR. PLANT:

Objection speculation.

20

THE COURT:

Sustained.

2i

MR* YOUNG:

I think he can testify about what

22

h

23

stipulate

24

Mr. Ollivier knew that he had no obligation?

25

^ would have done Your Honor unless counsel agreeable to
that he had no obligation

THE COURT:

or orally stipulate

Well I don't, he can make a statement
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Q

And you knew that wsis part of your obligation to

tell them so they knew you weren't going to be a guarantor
anymore didn't you?
A

Well just telling them wouldn't have done any good.

I had to make arrangements
Q

to have the loan paid off.

To go through that procedure to take care of

getting off the loan?
A

Yes.

Q

Because you knew that they relied on

you and

your financial ability in making their loans?
K

Right \»ell the^ relied or> ^e as a cotguarantor .

They dealt really with Mr. Heriford

but relied on me

somewhat.
Q

Your money right?

A

Relied on my financial strength

in case- of

a oroblem.
Q

Did you ever notify Western Surety that you were

no longer willinq to.serve as an indemnitor under the
Application for Bond?
A

I didn't know if Western Surety

existed until abou

six months ago.
Q

Did you ever notify them of any intent on your Dart

not to be an indemnitor in behalf of Heritage Motors
Inc.?
A

No.
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